Working Paper: NBER ID: w21099
Authors: Ginger Zhe Jin; Michael Luca; Daniel Martin
Abstract: This paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure theory: that strategic forces can lead those who possess private information to voluntarily provide it. In a simple two-person disclosure game, we find that senders disclose favorable information, but withhold less favorable information. The degree to which senders withhold information is strongly related to their stated beliefs about receiver actions, and their stated beliefs are accurate on average. Receiver actions are also strongly related to their stated beliefs, but receiver actions and beliefs suggest they are insufficiently skeptical about non-disclosed information in the absence of repeated feedback.
Keywords: information disclosure; strategic behavior; consumer beliefs; experimental economics
JEL Codes: C9; D8; K2; L51
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Information Quality (L15) | Disclosure Decisions (G11) |
| Sender Beliefs about Receiver Actions (D83) | Disclosure Decisions (G11) |
| Receiver Naivete (Y60) | Non-Disclosed Information Inference (D83) |
| Immediate Feedback (C91) | Receiver Mistakes (Y60) |
| Immediate Feedback (C91) | Sender Disclosures (G24) |
| Sender Beliefs about Receiver Strategies (D83) | Disclosure Decisions (G11) |