Working Paper: NBER ID: w21046
Authors: Atila Abdulkadiroglu; Nikhil Agarwal; Parag A. Pathak
Abstract: Coordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We show that uncoordinated offers in NYC’s school assignment mechanism generated mismatches. One-third of applicants were unassigned after the main round and later administratively placed at less desirable schools. We evaluate the effects of the new coordinated mechanism based on deferred acceptance using estimated student preferences. The new mechanism achieves 80% of the possible gains from a no-choice neighborhood extreme to a utilitarian benchmark. Coordinating offers dominates the effects of further algorithm modifications. Students most likely to be previously administratively assigned experienced the largest gains in welfare and subsequent achievement.
Keywords: school assignment; market design; welfare effects
JEL Codes: C78; D47; D50; D61; I21
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Transition from uncoordinated assignment system (P21) | Coordinated assignment system (P13) |
| Coordinated assignment system (P13) | Reduction in administratively assigned students (I21) |
| Reduction in administratively assigned students (I21) | Better matches between student preferences and school assignments (C78) |
| Coordinated assignment system (P13) | Students willing to travel further for schools (I23) |
| Coordinated assignment system (P13) | Improvement in welfare compared to no-choice scenario (D69) |
| Coordinated assignment system (P13) | Increase in test scores and graduation rates (I21) |
| Coordinated assignment system (P13) | Positive downstream effects on educational outcomes (I21) |
| Transition from uncoordinated assignment system (P21) | Positive downstream effects on educational outcomes (I21) |