Working Paper: NBER ID: w20977
Authors: Alberto F. Alesina; Ugo Troiano; Traviss Cassidy
Abstract: We evaluate the effect of a politician’s age on political governance, reelection rates,and policies using data on Italian local governments. Our results suggest that younger politicians are more likely to behave strategically in response to election incentives: they increase spending and obtain more transfers from higher levels of government in preelection years. We argue that is a sign of stronger career concerns incentives. The results are robust to adopting three different identification strategies: fixed-effects regression, standard regression discontinuity design, and an augmented regression discontinuity design that controls for residual heterogeneity.
Keywords: politicians' age; political governance; reelection rates; Italian local governments
JEL Codes: C21; D78; H72; H77; J18
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| younger politicians (D72) | increased spending (H56) |
| increased spending (H56) | higher transfers from higher government levels (H77) |
| younger mayors (R50) | success in attracting transfers from higher levels of government (H77) |
| younger mayors (R50) | higher probability of reelection (D72) |
| age of mayor (N93) | probability of running for reelection (D72) |
| age of mayor (N93) | probability of reelection (D72) |
| age of mayor (N93) | change in capital expenditure (G31) |
| younger mayors (R50) | increase in capital expenditures in pre-election years (H54) |