Working Paper: NBER ID: w20936
Authors: Mara Victoria Anauati; Brian Feld; Sebastian Galiani; Gustavo Torrens
Abstract: We conducted a laboratory experiment to test the comparative statics predictions of a new approach to collective action games based on the method of stability sets. We find robust support for the main theoretical predictions. As we increase the payoff of a successful collective action (accruing to all players and only to those who contribute), the share of cooperators increases. The experiment also points to new avenues for refining the theory. We find that, as the payoff of a successful collective action increases, subjects tend to upgrade their prior beliefs as to the expected share of cooperators. Although this does not have a qualitative effect on comparative static predictions, using the reported distribution of beliefs rather than an ad hoc uniform distribution reduces the gap between theoretical predictions and observed outcomes. This finding also allows to decompose the mechanism that leads to more cooperation into a ”belief effect” and a ”range of cooperation effect”.
Keywords: collective action; laboratory experiment; stability sets; cooperation
JEL Codes: C92; D72; H0; O0
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Increasing the payoff of successful collective action (D70) | Increase in the share of cooperators (C71) |
| Increasing the payoff of successful collective action (D70) | Upgrade in prior beliefs about expected share of cooperators (C71) |
| Upgrade in prior beliefs about expected share of cooperators (C71) | Increase in the share of cooperators (C71) |
| Prior beliefs about cooperation levels (C71) | Influence outcomes (I24) |
| Range of beliefs (Z12) | Influence cooperation (C71) |