Working Paper: NBER ID: w20863
Authors: Ross Levine; Chen Lin; Wensi Xie
Abstract: Do stock markets act as a “spare tire” during banking crises, providing an alternative corporate financing channel and mitigating the economic severity of banking crises? Using firm-level data in 36 countries from 1990 through 2011, we find that the adverse consequences of banking crises on firm profitability, employment, equity issuances, and investment efficiency are smaller in countries with stronger shareholder protection laws. These findings are not explained by the development of stock markets or financial institutions prior to the crises, the severity of the crisis, or overall economic, legal, and institutional development. The evidence is consistent with the view that stronger shareholder protection laws provide the legal infrastructure for stock markets to act as alternative sources of finance when banking systems go flat, easing the impact of the crisis on the economy.
Keywords: banking crises; shareholder protection; stock markets; economic recovery
JEL Codes: D22; E02; G21; G3; G38; K22
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Stronger shareholder protection laws (G38) | Smaller decline in firm profitability during systemic banking crises (F65) |
| Stronger shareholder protection laws (G38) | Employment falls less during banking crises (G01) |
| Stronger shareholder protection laws (G38) | Ability to issue more equity during banking crises (F65) |
| Stronger shareholder protection laws (G38) | Mitigating economic impacts of crises (H12) |