Are Patent Fees Effective at Weeding Out Low-Quality Patents?

Working Paper: NBER ID: w20785

Authors: Gatan de Rassenfosse; Adam B. Jaffe

Abstract: The paper investigates whether patent fees are an effective mechanism to deter the filing of low-quality patent applications. The study analyzes the effect on patent quality of the Patent Law Amendment Act of 1982, which resulted in a substantial increase in patenting fees at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Results from a series of difference-in-differences regressions suggest that the increase in fees led to a weeding out of low-quality patents. About 14 per cent of patents in the lowest quality decile were filtered out, and the effect was especially visible for companies with a large patent portfolio. The study has strong policy implications in the current context of concerns about declines in patent quality.

Keywords: patent fees; low-quality patents; patent quality; difference-in-differences

JEL Codes: K21; O31; O34; O38


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Increased patent fees due to the PLAA (D45)Reduction in low-quality patents (L15)
Increased patent fees due to the PLAA (D45)Reduction in low-quality patents among firms with large patent portfolios (L15)
Increased patent fees due to the PLAA (D45)Filtering effect more substantial for patents in lowest value decile (D45)
Increased patent fees due to the PLAA (D45)Filtering effect more substantial for patents in lowest value quintile (D45)

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