Working Paper: NBER ID: w20774
Authors: Christopher Avery; Soohyung Lee; Alvin E. Roth
Abstract: This paper examines non-price competition among colleges to attract highly qualified students, exploiting the South Korean setting where the national government sets rules governing applications. We identify some basic facts about the behavior of colleges before and after a 1994 policy change that changed the timing of the national college entrance exam and introduced early admissions, and propose a game-theoretic model that matches those facts. When applications reveal information about students that is of common interest to all colleges, lower-ranked colleges can gain in competition with higher-ranked colleges by limiting the number of possible applications.
Keywords: college admissions; nonprice competition; South Korea
JEL Codes: C78; I23
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Introduction of early admissions (Y20) | Lower-ranked colleges can compete more effectively with higher-ranked institutions (D29) |
| Introduction of early admissions (Y20) | Changes in college application behaviors (D29) |
| Lower-ranked colleges restricting applications (I23) | Attracting more qualified students (I23) |
| Policy change (D78) | Behavioral shift among colleges (I23) |
| Policy change (D78) | Distribution of admissions across colleges (I23) |
| Introduction of early admissions (Y20) | Increased competition for higher-ranked colleges (D29) |