Working Paper: NBER ID: w20747
Authors: Steven Shavell
Abstract: The deterrence of crime and its reduction through incapacitation are studied in a simple multiperiod model of crime and law enforcement. Optimal imprisonment sanctions and the optimal probability of sanctions are determined. A point of emphasis is that the incapacitation of individuals is often socially desirable even when they are potentially deterrable. The reason is that successful deterrence may require a relatively high probability of sanctions and thus a relatively high enforcement expense. In contrast, incapacitation may yield benefits no matter how low the probability of sanctions is—implying that incapacitation may be superior to deterrence.
Keywords: crime; deterrence; incapacitation
JEL Codes: K14; K42
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| optimal imprisonment sanctions (K14) | deterrence (K42) |
| cost of imprisonment (K14) | decision to incapacitate vs deter (H56) |
| probability of sanctions (p) (F51) | deterrence (K42) |
| probability of sanctions (p) (F51) | incapacitation benefits (H55) |
| incapacitation (H76) | reduced crime rates (K14) |