Working Paper: NBER ID: w20649
Authors: James Andreoni; Alison Sanchez
Abstract: We study whether actions are justified by beliefs, as is usually assumed, or whether beliefs are justified by actions. In our experiment, subjects participate in a trust game, after which they have an opportunity to state their beliefs about their opponent's actions. Subsequently, subjects participate in a task designed to "reveal" their true beliefs. We find that subjects who make selfish choices and show strategic sophistication falsely state their beliefs in order to project a more favorable social image. By contrast, their "revealed" beliefs were significantly more accurate, which betrayed these subjects as knowing that their selfishness was not justifiable by their opponent's behavior.
Keywords: social image; beliefs; trust game; selfishness; cooperation
JEL Codes: C9; D03; D83
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| selfish choices in the trust game (C72) | misstate beliefs (D83) |
| sophisticated selfish individuals (D64) | manipulate stated beliefs (C99) |
| social image concerns (Z13) | misrepresent beliefs (D83) |
| stated beliefs (D80) | revealed beliefs (Z12) |