Working Paper: NBER ID: w20554
Authors: Guillaume Bazot; Michael D. Bordo; Eric Monnet
Abstract: Under the classical gold standard (1880-1914), the Bank of France maintained a stable discount rate while the Bank of England changed its rate very frequently. Why did the policies of these central banks, the two pillars of the gold standard, differ so much? How did the Bank of France manage to keep a stable rate and continuously violate the "rules of the game"? This paper tackles these questions and shows that the domestic asset portfolio of the Bank of France played a crucial role in smoothing international shocks and in maintaining the stability of the discount rate. This policy provides a striking example of a central bank that uses its balance sheet to block the interest rate channel and protect the domestic economy from international constraints (Mundell's trilemma).
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: E42; E43; E50; E58; N13; N23
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Bank of England's discount rate (E52) | Bank of France's balance sheet (E58) |
| Bank of England's discount rate (E52) | Bank of France's domestic interest rates (E43) |
| Bank of England's discount rate (E52) | Bank of France's gold reserves (F33) |
| Bank of France's gold reserves (F33) | Bank of France's domestic credit portfolio (G21) |
| Bank of England's discount rate (E52) | Bank of France's domestic liquidity (E58) |
| Bank of France's domestic liquidity (E58) | Bank of France's official discount rate (E52) |