Slow to Hire, Quick to Fire: Employment Dynamics with Asymmetric Responses to News

Working Paper: NBER ID: w20473

Authors: Cosmin Ilut; Matthias Kehrig; Martin Schneider

Abstract: Concave hiring rules imply that firms respond more to bad shocks than to good shocks. They provide a unified explanation for several seemingly unrelated facts about employment growth in macro and micro data. In particular, they generate countercyclical movement in both aggregate conditional “macro” volatility and cross-sectional “micro” volatility, as well as negative skewness in the cross-section and in the time series at different levels of aggregation. Concave establishment-level responses of employment growth to TFP shocks estimated from Census data induce significant skewness, movements in volatility and amplification of bad aggregate shocks.

Keywords: employment dynamics; asymmetric responses; hiring rules; TFP shocks; macro volatility

JEL Codes: D2; D8; E20; J2


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
concave hiring rules (M51)firms respond more significantly to bad shocks (H32)
firms respond more significantly to bad shocks (H32)negative skewness in employment growth (J79)
negative TFP innovation (O39)decrease in employment (J63)
positive TFP innovation (O39)increase in employment (J68)
asymmetric hiring behavior (J79)employment growth volatility (J69)
concave hiring response (J23)greater negative skewness in employment growth (J79)
TFP innovations (O39)symmetric shocks (E32)

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