Working Paper: NBER ID: w2039
Authors: Joseph Tracy
Abstract: This paper examines the optimality of several seniority provisions which are common to U.S. union contracts. The paper focuses on the attempts by the initial union members to maximize their return from organizing the union. An overlapping generations model is used in the analysis. Seniority wage increases are found to serve as implicit initiation fees and thus serve as one means of appropriating rents from future union members. Layoff rules are shown to be optimal only when the organizers are constrained in the types of contracts they can write. Without these constraints, the optimal contract provides full insurance making layoff rules unnecessary. The paper concludes with a plausible set of constraints which organizers may face and discusses the conditions necessary for seniority layoff rules to result.
Keywords: Union Organization; Seniority Rules; Labor Economics
JEL Codes: J51; J53
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Seniority wage increases (J31) | Implicit initiation fees (Y20) |
| Seniority wage increases (J31) | Increased wages over time (J31) |
| Increased wages over time (J31) | Benefits for current members (J32) |
| Benefits for current members (J32) | Expense for future members (J32) |
| Constraints on contract writing (K12) | Optimal contract provides full insurance (G52) |
| Optimal contract provides full insurance (G52) | Layoff rules unnecessary (J63) |
| Specific constraints (D10) | Layoff rules are optimal (J65) |