Working Paper: NBER ID: w20337
Authors: Michael D. Frakes; Melissa F. Wasserman
Abstract: We explore how examiner behavior is altered by the time allocated for reviewing patent applications. Insufficient examination time may hamper examiner search and rejection efforts, leaving examiners more inclined to grant invalid applications. To test this prediction, we use application-level data to trace the behavior of individual examiners over the course of a series of promotions that carry with them reductions in examination-time allocations. We find evidence demonstrating that such promotions are associated with reductions in examination scrutiny and increases in granting tendencies, as well as evidence that those additional patents being issued on the margin are of below-average quality.
Keywords: patent applications; examiner behavior; invalid patents; time allocation; patent quality
JEL Codes: K00; O30; O38
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| reduced examination time (C41) | increase in granting tendencies (D64) |
| reduced examination time (C41) | higher rates of granting invalid patents (L49) |
| examiner promotions (M51) | reduced examination time (C41) |
| examiner promotions (M51) | increase in granting tendencies (D64) |
| examiner promotions (M51) | higher rates of granting invalid patents (L49) |
| reduced examination time (C41) | lower renewal rates for patents (O34) |
| reduced examination time (C41) | lower citation frequencies for patents (O34) |