Working Paper: NBER ID: w20326
Authors: Roberto Bonfatti; Kevin Hjortshøj O'Rourke
Abstract: Existing theories of pre-emptive war typically predict that the leading country may choose to launch a war on a follower who is catching up, since the follower cannot credibly commit to not use their increased power in the future. But it was Japan who launched a war against the West in 1941, not the West that pre-emptively attacked Japan. Similarly, many have argued that trade makes war less likely, yet World War I erupted at a time of unprecedented globalization. This paper develops a theoretical model of the relationship between trade and war which can help to explain both these observations. Dependence on strategic imports can lead follower nations to launch pre-emptive wars when they are potentially subject to blockade.
Keywords: Trade; War; Import Dependence; Preemptive War
JEL Codes: F51; F52; N70
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Import Dependence (D10) | Vulnerability to Blockade (D74) |
| Vulnerability to Blockade (D74) | Preemptive War (H56) |
| Import Dependence (D10) | Preemptive War (H56) |