Working Paper: NBER ID: w20311
Authors: Brian G. Knight
Abstract: This paper provides a unified theoretical and empirical analysis of three longstanding explanations for the consistent loss of support for the President’s party in midterm Congressional elections: (1) a Presidential penalty, defined as a preference for supporting the opposition during midterm years, (2) a surge and decline in voter turnout, and (3) a reversion to the mean in voter ideology. To quantify the contribution of each of these factors, we build an econometric model in which voters jointly choose whether or not to participate and which party to support in both House and Presidential elections. Estimated using ANES data from both Presidential and midterm years, the model can fully explain the observed midterm gaps, and counterfactual simulations demonstrate that each factor makes a sizable contribution towards the midterm gap, with the Presidential penalty playing the largest role.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: D7
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| voter participation (K16) | vote against president's party (D72) |
| presidential penalty (D72) | vote against president's party (D72) |
| intensity of preferences (D11) | voter turnout (K16) |
| voter turnout (K16) | presidential years (N42) |
| voter ideology (K16) | midterm years (J26) |
| mean reversion (C22) | voter ideology (K16) |