Working Paper: NBER ID: w20261
Authors: Santosh Anagol; Thomas Fujiwara
Abstract: Exploiting regression discontinuity designs in Brazilian, Indian, and Canadian first-past-the-post elections, we document that second-place candidates are substantially more likely than close third-place candidates to run in, and win, subsequent elections. Since both candidates lost the election and had similar electoral performance, this is the effect of being labeled the runner-up. We explore the potential mechanisms for this runner-up effect, including selection into candidacy, heuristic behavior by political actors, and the runner-up obtaining an advantage from strategic coordination (being more likely to become a focal point). Selection into candidacy is unlikely to explain the effect on winning subsequent elections, and the weight of evidence suggests the effect is driven by strategic coordination. We find no effect of finishing in third-place versus fourth-place.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: D03; D72; O10
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Candidates finishing in second place (Y40) | Candidates running in the next election (K16) |
| Candidates finishing in second place (Y40) | Candidates winning the next election (K16) |
| Being labeled the runnerup (D44) | Candidates running in the next election (K16) |
| Being labeled the runnerup (D44) | Candidates winning the next election (K16) |
| Candidates finishing in second place (Y40) | Strategic coordination among voters, donors, and parties (D79) |
| Candidates finishing in third place (Y40) | Candidates running in the next election (K16) |
| Candidates finishing in third place (Y40) | Candidates winning the next election (K16) |