Bases, Bullets, and Ballots: The Effect of US Military Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia

Working Paper: NBER ID: w20213

Authors: Oeindrila Dube; Suresh Naidu

Abstract: Does foreign military assistance strengthen or further weaken fragile states facing internal conflict? Aid may strengthen the state by bolstering its repressive capacity vis-à-vis armed non-state actors, or weaken it if resources are diverted to these very groups. We examine how U.S. military aid affects political violence in Colombia. We exploit the allocation of U.S. military aid to Colombian military bases, and compare how aid affects municipalities with and without bases. We use an instrument based on worldwide increases in U.S. military aid (excluding Latin America). We find that U.S. military assistance leads to differential increases in attacks by paramilitaries, but has no effect on guerrilla attacks. Aid also results in more paramilitary (but not guerrilla) homicides during election years, particularly in politically competitive municipalities. The findings suggest that foreign military assistance may strengthen armed non-state actors, undermining domestic political institutions.

Keywords: US military aid; political conflict; Colombia; paramilitary violence; guerrilla attacks

JEL Codes: H56; O54


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
US military assistance (H56)increased paramilitary violence (H56)
increased US military aid (F35)increased paramilitary attacks (H56)
US military assistance (H56)no effect on guerrilla violence (D74)
increased military aid (H56)increased paramilitary homicides (H56)
increased military aid (H56)diversion of resources from Colombian military to paramilitary groups (H56)
diversion of resources from Colombian military to paramilitary groups (H56)exacerbation of political conflict (D74)

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