Working Paper: NBER ID: w20145
Authors: Raymond Fisman; Pamela Jakiela; Shachar Kariv
Abstract: We measure the distributional preferences of a large, diverse sample of Americans by embedding modified dictator games that vary the relative price of redistribution in the American Life Panel. Subjects' choices are generally consistent with maximizing a (social) utility function. We decompose distributional preferences into two distinct components - fair-mindedness (tradeoffs between oneself and others) and equality-efficiency tradeoffs - by estimating constant elasticity of substitution utility functions at the individual level. Approximately equal numbers of Americans have equality-focused and efficiency-focused distributional preferences. After controlling for individual characteristics, our experimental measures of equality-efficiency tradeoffs predict the political decisions of our subjects.
Keywords: distributional preferences; income redistribution; political behavior
JEL Codes: C91; D64
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| demographic factors (J11) | significant heterogeneity among subjects (C21) |
| distributional preferences (D39) | political behavior (D72) |
| efficiency-focused individuals (D61) | voting behavior (D72) |
| subjects' choices in the modified dictator games (C72) | distributional preferences (D39) |