Working Paper: NBER ID: w20082
Authors: Andrew Beath; Fotini Christia; Georgy Egorov; Ruben Enikolopov
Abstract: We examine the effect of electoral rules on the quality of elected officials using a unique field experiment which induced randomized variation in the method of council elections in 250 villages in Afghanistan. In particular, we compare at-large elections, with a single multi-member district, to district elections, with multiple single member districts. We propose a theoretical model where the difference in the quality of elected officials between the two electoral systems occurs because elected legislators have to bargain over policy, which induces citizens in district elections to vote strategically for candidates with more polarized policy positions even at the expense of candidates' competence. Consistent with the predictions of the model, we find that elected officials in at-large elections are more educated than those in district elections and that this effect is stronger in more heterogeneous villages. We also find evidence that elected officials in district elections have more biased preferences.
Keywords: electoral rules; quality of politicians; field experiment; Afghanistan
JEL Codes: D72; D78
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
Cause | Effect |
---|---|
At-large elections (K16) | Higher education of elected officials (I23) |
District elections (D79) | Lower education of elected officials (I24) |
At-large elections (K16) | Less biased preferences of elected officials (D72) |
District elections (D79) | More biased preferences of elected officials (D72) |
Electoral system (K16) | Quality of elected candidates (D79) |
Quality of elected candidates (D79) | Higher educational attainment (I23) |
At-large elections (K16) | Faster project implementation (O22) |
District elections (D79) | Slower project implementation (H43) |
Candidates' quality (D79) | Bias in district elections (J15) |
Candidates' quality (D79) | No correlation with bias in at-large elections (D79) |