Working Paper: NBER ID: w20078
Authors: Howard Bodenhorn; Eugene N. White
Abstract: Contemporary bank governance is criticized for manager-dominated (insider) boards of directors, but from the beginning of the nineteenth century, bank presidents appear also to have operated as chairmen of the boards of directors. However, the managers were constrained by a variety of rules that tended to align the interests of management, shareholders and other stakeholders until the mid-twentieth century. We trace this development through New York banking law and new data on banks chartered by the State of New York.
Keywords: Bank Governance; Corporate Governance; Historical Analysis
JEL Codes: G21; G30; N21
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Regulatory changes over time (G18) | Structure of bank boards (G21) |
| Regulatory changes over time (G18) | Size of bank boards (G21) |
| Regulatory changes over time (G18) | Ownership concentration (G32) |
| Changes in banking practices and regulatory pressures (G28) | Governance dynamics (H11) |
| Regulatory reforms (G18) | Managerial self-dealing (G34) |