Working Paper: NBER ID: w20048
Authors: Hunt Allcott; Richard Sweeney
Abstract: With a large nationwide retailer, we run a natural field experiment to measure the effects of energy use information disclosure, customer rebates, and sales agent incentives on demand for energy efficient durable goods. While a combination of large rebates plus sales incentives substantially increases market share, information and sales incentives alone each have zero statistical effect and explain at most a small fraction of the low baseline market share. Sales agents strategically comply only partially with the experiment, targeting information at more interested consumers but not discussing energy efficiency with the disinterested majority. These results suggest that at current prices in this context, seller-provided information is not a major barrier to energy efficiency investments. We theoretically and empirically explore the novel policy option of combining customer subsidies with government-provided sales incentives.
Keywords: energy efficiency; information disclosure; sales agents; field experiment
JEL Codes: D04; D12; L15; L51; L68; Q48
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| information provision (L86) | demand for energy-efficient models (Q41) |
| sales agents' behavior (L85) | consumer purchasing decisions (D12) |
| lack of demand for energy-efficient models (Q41) | consumers' underestimation of benefits or perceived high price (D11) |
| consumers' unawareness of energy star options (D19) | failure of information transmission (D83) |
| incentivizing sales agents (L85) | improve information disclosure (G38) |
| large customer rebates + sales incentives (L14) | market share of energy-efficient products (Q41) |
| $100 customer rebate (M31) | likelihood of purchasing energy star models (L68) |