Health Status, Disability and Retirement Incentives in Belgium

Working Paper: NBER ID: w20035

Authors: Alain Jousten; Mathieu Lefebvre; Sergio Perelman

Abstract: Many Belgian retire well before the statutory retirement age. Numerous exit routes from the labor force can be identified: old-age pensions, conventional early retirement, disability insurance, and unemployment insurance are the most prominent ones. We analyze the retirement decision of Belgian workers adopting an option value framework, and pay special attention to the role of health status. We estimate probit models of retirement using data from SHARE. The results show that health and incentives matter in the decision to exit from the labor market. Based on these results, we simulate the effect of potential reforms on retirement.

Keywords: health status; disability insurance; retirement incentives; Belgium

JEL Codes: H55; J21; J26


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
health status (I12)retirement probability (J26)
retirement incentives (J26)retirement probability (J26)
age (J14)retirement probability (J26)
education (I29)retirement probability (J26)
active spouse (J22)retirement probability (J26)
household wealth (D14)retirement probability (J26)

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