Working Paper: NBER ID: w19807
Authors: Jesse M. Shapiro
Abstract: A journalist reports to a voter on an unknown, policy-relevant state. Competing special interests can make claims that contradict the facts but seem credible to the voter. A reputational incentive to avoid taking sides leads the journalist to report special interests’ claims to the voter. In equilibrium, the voter can remain uninformed even when the journalist is perfectly informed. Communication is improved if the journalist discloses her partisan leanings. The model provides an account of persistent public ignorance on climate change that is consistent with narrative and quantitative evidence.
Keywords: Climate Change; Media; Special Interests; Public Policy
JEL Codes: D72; D83; Q54
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| competing special interests (D72) | public ignorance on climate change (Q54) |
| media's reporting practices (L82) | public ignorance on climate change (Q54) |
| journalists' reputational incentive to present balanced views (A14) | distortion in public understanding (D73) |
| special interests benefit from creating ambiguity in reporting (D72) | policies less likely to reflect accurate scientific information (J18) |
| transparency in journalism (G38) | quality of public information (L15) |
| disclosure of partisan leanings by journalists (D72) | accuracy of reporting (C83) |