Working Paper: NBER ID: w19717
Authors: Mark Aguiar; Manuel Amador
Abstract: We address the question of whether and how a sovereign should reduce its external indebtedness when default is a significant possibility, with a particular focus on whether a sovereign should buy back or dilute existing long-term sovereign bonds. Our main finding is that when reduction of debt is optimal, the sovereign should remain passive in the long-term bond market during the deleveraging process, retiring long-term bonds as they mature but never actively issuing or buying back these bonds. The only active margin is the short-term bond market, which involves partial roll over of such debt. Any active maturity management, as will typically be required to address rollover crisis risk, will be delayed until the end of the deleveraging process. We also show that there exist a set of Pareto improving debt restructurings in which maturities are shortened; however, these cannot be implemented by trading in competitive secondary markets.
Keywords: Sovereign Debt; Debt Restructuring; Multiple Maturities
JEL Codes: E62; F34; F41
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| sovereign's decision to remain passive in long-term bond market (G15) | effectiveness of deleveraging strategy (G33) |
| active management of long-term bonds during deleveraging (G12) | shrinkage of government's budget set (H60) |
| market structure (D49) | feasibility of debt restructurings (G33) |
| sovereign's ability to commit to future payments (H63) | price of long-term bonds (E43) |
| lack of commitment (J22) | higher bond prices (G12) |
| higher bond prices (G12) | speed of deleveraging (G33) |