Working Paper: NBER ID: w19573
Authors: Alex Edmans
Abstract: This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the different channels through which blockholders (large shareholders) engage in corporate governance. In classical models, blockholders exert governance through direct intervention in a firm's operations, otherwise known as "voice." These theories have motivated empirical research on the determinants and consequences of activism. More recent models show that blockholders can govern through the alternative mechanism of "exit" - selling their shares if the manager underperforms. These theories give rise to new empirical studies on the two-way relationship between blockholders and financial markets, linking corporate finance with asset pricing. Blockholders may also worsen governance by extracting private benefits of control or pursuing objectives other than firm value maximization. I highlight the empirical challenges in identifying causal effects of and on blockholders, and the typical strategies attempted to achieve identification. I close with directions for future research.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: G34
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| blockholders with larger stakes (G34) | higher firm value (G32) |
| blockholders can enhance governance through direct intervention (voice) (G34) | higher firm value (G32) |
| blockholders can enhance governance through the threat of selling shares (exit) (G34) | higher firm value (G32) |
| blockholders may exacerbate agency problems by extracting private benefits (G34) | lower firm value (G32) |