Working Paper: NBER ID: w19560
Authors: Joshua S. Gans; Fiona E. Murray; Scott Stern
Abstract: This paper provides a theoretical investigation of the tension over knowledge disclosure between firms and their scientific employees. While empirical research suggests that scientists exhibit a "taste for science," such open disclosures can limit a firm's competitive advantage or ability to profitably commercialize their innovations. To explore how this tension is resolved we focus on the strategic interaction between researchers and firms bargaining over whether (and how) knowledge will be disclosed. We evaluate four disclosure strategies: secrecy, patenting, open science (scientific publication) and patent-paper pairs providing insights into the determinants of the disclosure strategy of a firm. We find that patents and publications can be complementary instruments facilitating the disclosure of knowledge-providing predictions as to when stronger IP protection regimes might drive openness by firms.
Keywords: Intellectual Property; Disclosure Strategies; Innovation Management
JEL Codes: M55; O32; O34
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Firms face a tension between secrecy (D82) | disclosure of knowledge (D83) |
| Disclosure strategy (G38) | firm competitiveness (L21) |
| Stronger intellectual property protection (O34) | more open disclosure practices (G38) |
| Patenting (O34) | publishing (L82) |
| Negotiation process regarding disclosure rights (C78) | overall innovation landscape (O36) |
| Disclosure choices (G24) | firm competitiveness (L21) |
| Disclosure choices (G24) | employee preferences (M52) |