Working Paper: NBER ID: w1954
Authors: Ronald G. Ehrenberg; Richard P. Chaykowski; Randy A. Ehrenberg
Abstract: Given the important role that school district administrators \nplay in the educational process, one might expect their \n"performance" to be of fundamental importance in determining both \nhow much students learn and the cost of public education to \ntaxpayers. Yet, while public debate has considered the issue of \nmerit pay plans for teachers, virtually no attention has been \ndirected to the methods by which school administrators are \ncompensated. \nThis paper provides evidence on whether school superintendents \nare explicitly or implicitly rewarded for their \n"performance" by higher compensation and/or greater opportunities \nfor mobility. We analyze panel data from over 700 school \n'districts in New Ycrk State during the 1978-79 to 1982-83 period. \nMeasures of performance are defined and then entered into salary \nlevel, salary change, and mobility equations. While evidence is \nprovided that school superintendents are rewarded for \n"performance", the magnitude of the rewards appear to be quite \nsmall.
Keywords: merit pay; school superintendents; educational performance; compensation; mobility
JEL Codes: I21; J45
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Higher educational performance (I23) | Higher salary levels for superintendents who remain in the same position (J62) |
| Higher tax performance (H21) | Lower salaries (J31) |
| Higher tax performance (H21) | Greater mobility prospects (J62) |
| Better tax performance (H21) | Higher paying positions (J31) |
| Higher educational performance (I23) | Higher salary increases for superintendents who change jobs (J62) |