Working Paper: NBER ID: w19528
Authors: Elizabeth Bodine-Baron; Sarah Nowak; Raffaello Varadavas; Neeraj Sood
Abstract: Traditional economic models of vaccination assume that agents free-ride on the vaccination decision of others. These models show that private vaccination rates are always below the social optimal and even large subsidies cannot achieve disease eradication. In this paper, we build a model where in addition to the desire to free-ride, agents have a desire to conform to the vaccination decisions of their peers. In this model privately optimal vaccination rates can be higher or lower than the social optimal and thus subsidies for vaccination are not always optimal. However, in certain cases, even small subsidies can achieve disease eradication.
Keywords: vaccination; peer effects; public health policy; economic models
JEL Codes: H2; H21; I1; I28
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| peer vaccination rates (C92) | individual vaccination decisions (I18) |
| nonconforming effects (C92) | vaccination likelihood (C46) |
| conforming effects (C92) | vaccination likelihood (C46) |
| conforming peer effects (C92) | privately optimal vaccination rates (H41) |
| traditional models (C20) | privately optimal vaccination rates (H41) |
| subsidies (H20) | disease eradication (Q16) |