Working Paper: NBER ID: w19398
Authors: Robin Burgess; Remi Jedwab; Edward Miguel; Ameet Morjaria; Gerard Padro i Miquel
Abstract: Ethnic favoritism is seen as antithetical to development. This paper provides credible quantification of the extent of ethnic favoritism using data on road building in Kenyan districts across the 1963-2011 period. Guided by a model it then examines whether the transition in and out of democracy under the same president constrains or exacerbates ethnic favoritism. Across the 1963 to 2011 period, we find strong evidence of ethnic favoritism: districts that share the ethnicity of the president receive twice as much expenditure on roads and have four times the length of paved roads built. This favoritism disappears during periods of democracy.
Keywords: ethnic favoritism; public resource allocation; democracy; Kenya; road building
JEL Codes: H41; H54; O18; O55
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Political regime (P16) | Ethnic favoritism in road investment (R42) |
| Ethnicity of the president (J15) | Road expenditures in coethnic districts (H54) |
| Autocratic regime (D70) | Road expenditures in coethnic districts (H54) |
| Democratic regime (D72) | Reduction in ethnic favoritism in road investment (R42) |
| Coethnic president (J15) | Road spending in autocratic periods (H54) |
| Democratic institutions (D02) | Constraints on executive (D72) |
| Constraints on executive (D72) | Reduction in ethnic favoritism (J15) |