Working Paper: NBER ID: w1938
Authors: David E. Bloom; Christopher L. Cavanagh
Abstract: This paper analyses data on union and employer rankings of different panels of arbitrators in an actual arbitration system. A random utility model of bargainer preferences is developed and estimated. The estimates indicate that unions and employers have similar preferences, in favor of lawyers, more experienced arbitrators, and arbitrators who seem to have previously favored their side. Alternative rankings models, which are estimated to test whether bargainers rank arbitrators strategically, reveal no evidence of strategic behavior.
Keywords: Arbitration; Labor Economics; Collective Bargaining
JEL Codes: J52; D78
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Arbitrator characteristics (J52) | Preferences of unions and employers (J58) |
| Type of training (law vs. economics) (K29) | Ranking given by parties (D79) |
| Experience of arbitrators (J52) | Preferences of unions and employers (J58) |
| No strategic behavior (C72) | True preferences in rankings (D11) |