Working Paper: NBER ID: w19354
Authors: Bo Zhao
Abstract: This paper studies an economy inhabited by overlapping generations of homeowners and investors, with the only difference between the two being that homeowners derive utility from housing services whereas investors do not. Tight collateral constraint limits the borrowing capacity of homeowners and drives the equilibrium interest rate level down to the housing price growth rate, which makes housing attractive as a store of value for investors. As long as the rental market friction is high enough, the investors will hold a positive number of vacant houses in equilibrium. A housing bubble arises in an equilibrium in which investors hold houses for resale purposes only and without the expectation of receiving a dividend either in terms of utility or rent. The model can be applied to China, where the housing bubble can be attributed to the rapid decline in the replacement rate of the pension system.
Keywords: Housing Bubble; Overlapping Generations; Collateral Constraints
JEL Codes: D21; E13; E21; R21
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Tight collateral constraints (E51) | Limited homeowners' borrowing capacity (G51) |
| Limited homeowners' borrowing capacity (G51) | Reduction in equilibrium interest rate (E43) |
| Reduction in equilibrium interest rate (E43) | Housing price growth rate (R31) |
| Housing price growth rate (R31) | Housing bubble formation (R31) |
| High rental market friction (R21) | Investors holding vacant houses (R21) |
| Investors holding vacant houses (R21) | Housing bubble formation (R31) |