Migration and Fiscal Competition within a Union

Working Paper: NBER ID: w19282

Authors: Assaf Razin; Efraim Sadka

Abstract: We develop a stylized EU-type model of a union consisting of rich, capital-abundant and high productivity countries, and poor, capital-scarce and low productivity countries. We address two main issues: the efficiency of tax competition and the effect of factor mobility on the size of the welfare state. We identify a fiscal externality which impairs the efficiency of tax competition. We also demonstrate how capital mobility within the union strengthens the competition over migrants from outside of the union.

Keywords: Migration; Fiscal Competition; Welfare State

JEL Codes: F22; H21


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
tax competition (H26)inefficiencies (D61)
inefficiencies (D61)reduced efficiency of tax rates and welfare benefits (H21)
capital mobility (F20)increased competition for migrants (F22)
increased competition for migrants (F22)increased migration flows (F22)
tax competition (H26)competition for migrants (F22)
competition for migrants (F22)higher welfare benefits offered by rich countries (I31)
higher welfare benefits offered by rich countries (I31)increased number of migrants (F22)

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