Working Paper: NBER ID: w19278
Authors: Russell Cooper; Kalin Nikolov
Abstract: This paper studies the interaction of government debt and financial markets. Both markets are fragile: excessively responsive to fundamentals and prone to strategic uncertainty. This interaction, termed a ‘diabolic loop’, is driven by government choice to bail out banks and the resulting incentives for banks to hold government debt rather than to self-insure through equity buffers. We provide conditions such that the ‘diabolic loop’ is a Nash Equilibrium of the interaction between banks and the government. Instability originates in debt markets and is channeled to financial arrangements, and then back again. \nThe analysis highlights the critical role of bank equity for the existence of a diabolic loop. When equity is issued, no diabolic loop exists. In equilibrium, banks' rational expectations of a bailout ensure that no equity is issued and the sovereign-bank loop operates.
Keywords: government debt; banking fragility; strategic uncertainty; Nash equilibrium
JEL Codes: E44; G33; H12; H63
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Government's bailout decision (G28) | Banks' behavior regarding equity issuance (G21) |
| Government's bailout decision (G28) | Stability of debt markets (E43) |
| Banks' behavior regarding equity issuance (G21) | Vulnerability to sovereign debt fluctuations (F65) |
| Government's bailout decision (G28) | Increased reliance on government debt (H69) |