Working Paper: NBER ID: w19221
Authors: David K. Levine; Salvatore Modica
Abstract: In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their "exclusiveness" we find that these hegemonies will be inefficiently "extractive" in the sense of having inefficiently high taxes, high compensation for state officials, and low welfare.
Keywords: evolution; conflict; hegemony; state power
JEL Codes: A0; A1; A10; C0; C00; C70; C72; C73; D0; D00; D01; D02; D03; D3; D42; D61; D63; D71; D72; D73; D74; D78
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| more powerful states (F55) | advantage when influence of outsiders is small (D79) |
| advantage when influence of outsiders is small (D79) | tendency toward hegemony (D74) |
| state power (P26) | institutional exclusivity (F55) |
| increasing outside influence (F69) | decreases likelihood of hegemony (D74) |
| state power (P26) | persistence of state power (H11) |
| hegemonic states (P16) | inefficiently extractive (L72) |