Working Paper: NBER ID: w19203
Authors: Saumitra Jha
Abstract: I examine how the historical legacies of inter-ethnic complementarity and competition influence contemporary electoral competition and its effects on patterns of ethnic violence. Using local comparisons within Gujarat, a single Indian state known for its non-violent local traditions yet also for widespread ethnic pogroms in 2002, I provide evidence that while towns with close votes in the preceding state elections do predict an increased incidence of ethnic riots, these effects are diminished in medieval port towns that historically enjoyed exogenous inter-ethnic complementarities. Furthermore, unlike other towns where pre-riot electoral competitiveness coincided with historic inter-ethnic competition and where the ruling party reaped well-targeted electoral dividends from the riots, medieval port constituencies exhibited a relative vote swing of more than seven percentage points against that party. These rendered medieval port constituencies marginal constituencies in future elections, which also saw less ethnic violence. \n\nI interpret these results as consistent with the existence of a fundamentally conditional, yet magnifying interaction between electoral competition and local institutions in generating incentives for ethnic violence. Where marginal electoral constituencies coincide with or reflect pre-existing inter-ethnic economic competition, politicians have both enhanced local and state-wide incentives to foster ethnic mobilization and violence. On the other hand, when the focus of electoral competition shifts to constituencies enjoying complementary norms and organizations supporting local inter-ethnic tolerance, this can reduce state-wide incentives for ethnic violence.
Keywords: Ethnic violence; Electoral competition; Interethnic relations; Gujarat; Political behavior
JEL Codes: N0; N3; N35; N4; N45; N9; O1; O12; R1; Z1; Z12; Z13
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| electoral competition (D72) | ethnic violence (J15) |
| historical interethnic complementarity (F55) | ethnic violence (J15) |
| electoral competition + historical interethnic complementarity (D79) | ethnic violence (J15) |
| interethnic competition (J15) | electoral advantages for BJP (K16) |
| close electoral races in 1998 elections (K16) | ethnic riots in 2002 pogroms (J15) |
| medieval port constituencies (N93) | vote swing against BJP (D72) |