Working Paper: NBER ID: w1917
Authors: Edward P. Lazear
Abstract: Labor relations involve incentive problems. The market solves these problems by developing a variety of institutions. This paper describes and assesses the various forms of incentive contracts.
Keywords: Incentive Contracts; Labor Economics; Principal-Agent Problem
JEL Codes: J33
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| incentive contracts (salaries) (J33) | worker effort (J29) |
| incentive contracts (piece rates) (J33) | worker effort (J29) |
| incentive contracts (piece rates) (J33) | firm productivity (D22) |
| principal-agent problem (D82) | incentive contracts (D86) |
| output-based contracts (sharecropping) (Q15) | efficient outcomes (D61) |
| risk aversion and heterogeneity (D81) | incentive contracts (D86) |
| well-structured incentive contracts (D86) | sorting of workers (J63) |