Working Paper: NBER ID: w19027
Authors: Filipe R. Campante; Quocanh Do
Abstract: We show that isolated capital cities are robustly associated with greater levels of corruption across US states, in line with the view that this isolation reduces accountability, and in contrast with the alternative hypothesis that it might forestall political capture. We then provide direct evidence that the spatial distribution of population relative to the capital affects different accountability mechanisms over state politics: newspaper coverage, voter knowledge and information, and turnout. We also find evidence against the capture hypothesis: isolated capitals are associated with more money in state-level campaigns. Finally, we show that isolation is linked with worse public good provision.
Keywords: corruption; accountability; capital cities; US states; political economy
JEL Codes: D72; D73; L82; R12; R23; R50
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Isolation of capital cities (R53) | Reduced accountability (H60) |
| Reduced accountability (H60) | Higher levels of corruption (D73) |
| Isolation of capital cities (R53) | Decreased media coverage and voter engagement (K16) |
| Decreased media coverage and voter engagement (K16) | Facilitation of corrupt practices by politicians (D73) |
| Isolation of capital cities (R53) | Lower newspaper coverage of state politics (H79) |
| Isolation of capital cities (R53) | Decreased voter knowledge and turnout (K16) |
| Isolation of capital cities (R53) | Higher levels of corruption (D73) |
| Isolation of capital cities (R53) | Positive correlation with campaign contributions (D79) |
| Isolation of capital cities (R53) | Lower spending on education, public welfare, and healthcare (I39) |