Working Paper: NBER ID: w18932
Authors: Grant Miller; Kimberly Singer Babiarz
Abstract: This chapter surveys experience with performance pay in developing country health programs. In doing so, it focuses on four key conceptual issues: (1) What to reward, (2) Who to reward, (3) How to reward, and (4) What unintended consequences might performance incentives create. We highlight that the use of performance pay has outpaced growth in corresponding empirical evidence. Moreover, very little research on performance incentives focuses on the underlying conceptual issues that we outline. We consider these to be important constraints to the design of better performance incentives in low- and middle-income country health programs.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: H51; I12; O12; O17; Z18
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| performance incentives (M52) | provider effort (I11) |
| provider effort (I11) | improved health outcomes (I14) |
| performance incentives (M52) | unintended consequences (D62) |
| unintended consequences (D62) | neglect of non-contracted outcomes (D86) |
| performance incentives (M52) | multitasking (J22) |
| multitasking (J22) | reduction in teaching time (A21) |
| performance incentives (M52) | improved health outcomes (I14) |