Working Paper: NBER ID: w18872
Authors: Siqi Zheng; Matthew E. Kahn; Weizeng Sun; Danglun Luo
Abstract: China's extremely high levels of urban air, water and greenhouse gas emissions levels pose local and global environmental challenges. China's urban leaders have substantial influence and discretion over the evolution of economic activity that generates such externalities. This paper examines the political economy of urban leaders' incentives to tackle pollution issues. Based on a principal-agent framework, we present evidence consistent with the hypothesis that both the central government and the public are placing pressure on China's urban leaders to mitigate externalities. Such "pro-green" incentives suggest that many of China's cities could enjoy significant environmental progress in the near future.
Keywords: China; Urban Mayors; Pollution; Public Environmentalism; Central Government
JEL Codes: H23; H41; Q48; Q53; R5
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| central government's regime shift (E63) | urban leaders' political pressure (R59) |
| environmental performance indicators (Q56) | promotion probabilities (M51) |
| higher expenditures on pollution control facilities (Q52) | promotion probabilities (M51) |
| public concern over pollution (Q53) | local leaders' actions (D70) |
| cities with higher public concern indices (R53) | environmental progress (O44) |