Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default

Working Paper: NBER ID: w18855

Authors: Michael Tomz; Mark L. J. Wright

Abstract: In this essay we review the empirical literature about sovereign debt and default. As we survey the work of economists, historians, and political scientists, we also emphasize parallel developments by theorists and recommend steps to improve the correspondence between theory and data.

Keywords: No keywords provided

JEL Codes: C82; E01; F21; F34; F51; F55; N20


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Repayment behavior (G51)Future borrowing capacity (G32)
Default (Y70)Exclusion from international capital markets (F65)
Repayment (G51)Future borrowing opportunities (G51)
Default (Y70)Costs such as loss of access to capital markets and economic sanctions (F51)
Probability of default (G33)Bond pricing (G12)
Higher default risks (G32)Increased yields on sovereign bonds (G15)
Domestic political factors (D72)Decision to repay or default (G33)
Stronger political institutions (P16)Lower default rates (E43)
Historical default events (N23)Current borrowing costs (G21)

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