Working Paper: NBER ID: w18674
Authors: Eli Berman; Joseph Felter; Jacob N. Shapiro; Erin Troland
Abstract: Most interpretations of prevalent counterinsurgency theory imply that increasing government services will reduce rebel violence. Empirically, however, development programs and economic activity sometimes yield increased violence. Using new panel data on development spending in Iraq, we show that violence reducing effects of aid are greater when (a) projects are small, (b) troop strength is high, and (c) professional development expertise is available. These findings are consistent with a "hearts and minds" model, which predicts that violence reduction will result when projects are secure, valued by community members, and implementation is conditional on the behavior of non-combatants.
Keywords: development; violence; counterinsurgency; Iraq; aid effectiveness
JEL Codes: F52; F63; F68; H41; H56; K42; N45; O1; O17; Z1; Z12
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| presence of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) (F35) | violence-reducing effects of aid spending (F35) |
| design and implementation of development programs (O19) | violence reduction (D74) |
| development spending (O29) | insurgent violence (D74) |
| small projects (CERP) (O22) | insurgent violence (D74) |