The Economics of Faith: Using an Apocalyptic Prophecy to Elicit Religious Beliefs in the Field

Working Paper: NBER ID: w18641

Authors: Ned Augenblick; Jesse M. Cunha; Ernesto Dal B; Justin M. Rao

Abstract: We model religious faith as a "demand for beliefs," following the logic of the Pascalian wager. We then demonstrate how an experimental intervention can exploit standard elicitation techniques to measure religious belief by varying prizes associated with making choices contrary to one's belief in a, crucially, falsifiable religious proposition. We implemented this approach with a group that expected the "End of the World" to happen on May 21, 2011 by offering prizes payable before and after May 21st. The results suggest the existence of a demand for extreme, sincere beliefs that was unresponsive to experimental manipulations in price.

Keywords: religious beliefs; experimental economics; apocalyptic prophecy; Pascal's wager

JEL Codes: D8; D91; Z1


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Manipulation of belief costs (D91)Sincerity of beliefs held (Z12)
Changes in the cost of holding beliefs (D83)Number of individuals who choose to believe (C91)
Experimental manipulation (C90)Beliefs of Family Radio members (Z12)
Family Radio members' choices in BDM experiment (C99)Demand for sincere religious beliefs (Z12)
Lack of significant differences in choices across treatment conditions (C90)Beliefs are inelastic to changes in costs (D11)
SDA members' choices (D71)Standard time preference (D15)
Family Radio members' beliefs (Z12)Sincere faith in the demand side of religion (Z12)

Back to index