Working Paper: NBER ID: w18633
Authors: Gerard Padro i Miquel; Nancy Qian; Yang Yao
Abstract: This study examines how the economic effects of elections in rural China depend on voter heterogeneity, for which we proxy with religious fractionalization. We first document religious composition and the introduction of village-level elections for a nearly nationally representative sample of over two hundred villages. Then, we examine the interaction effect of heterogeneity and the introduction of elections on village-government provision of public goods. The interaction effect is negative. We interpret this as evidence that voter heterogeneity constrains the potential benefits of elections for public goods provision.
Keywords: Public Goods; Elections; Social Fragmentation; China
JEL Codes: O38; O43; P16; P35
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Introduction of elections (K16) | Increased public goods expenditure (H49) |
| Voter heterogeneity (D72) | Diminished benefits of elections for public goods provision (D72) |
| Religious fractionalization (Z12) | Reduced public goods expenditure in heterogeneous villages (H49) |
| Voter heterogeneity (religious fractionalization) (D72) | Lower preference for public goods in heterogeneous villages (H41) |
| Heterogeneity (D29) | Poor implementation of electoral reforms (K16) |