Working Paper: NBER ID: w18424
Authors: Ilia Rainer; Francesco Trebbi
Abstract: The study of autocracies and weakly institutionalized countries is plagued by scarcity of information about the relative strength of different players within the political system. This paper presents novel data on the composition of government coalitions in a sample of fifteen post-colonial African countries suited to this task. We emphasize the role of the executive branch as the central fulcrum of all national political systems in our sample, especially relative to other institutional bodies such as the legislative assembly. Leveraging on the impressive body of work documenting the crucial role of ethnic fragmentation as a main driver of political and social friction in Africa, the paper further details the construction of ethnic composition measures for executive cabinets. We discuss how this novel source of information may help shed light on the inner workings of typically opaque African political elites.
Keywords: Political Power; Ethnic Composition; African Politics; Executive Branch; Governance
JEL Codes: H10; O38; O55
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Ethnic composition of the executive branch (J15) | Power-sharing arrangements (O17) |
| Ethnic composition of the executive branch (J15) | Political stability (P16) |
| Ethnic fragmentation (F12) | Political and social friction in Africa (O17) |
| Ethnic composition of executive cabinets (J15) | Governance outcomes (H11) |
| Allocation of cabinet positions based on ethnic representation (J15) | Managing elite relations (D71) |
| Ethnic composition of cabinets (J15) | Public policy outcomes (D78) |
| Ministers as representatives of their ethnic groups (J15) | Channeling resources and support (I24) |