Economic Effects of Runs on Early Shadow Banks: Trust Companies and the Impact of the Panic of 1907

Working Paper: NBER ID: w18264

Authors: Carola Frydman; Eric Hilt; Lily Y. Zhou

Abstract: We use the unique circumstances that led to the Panic of 1907 to analyze its impact on economic activity. The panic was fuelled by runs on the 'shadow banks' of the time, New York's trust companies. But the shock that triggered the runs was unrelated to the nonfinancial corporations affiliated with those institutions. Using newly collected data, we find that small corporations with close ties to the trust companies that lost the most deposits experienced an immediate decline in their stock price of 10.4 percentage points, and performed worse in the years following the panic across a range of outcomes, including their return on equity, which fell 13.1 percent, their dividend rate, which fell 22 percent, and their average interest costs, which rose 8.3 percent, relative to mean pre-panic levels. The effect on their investment rate was much greater: it fell by nearly 50 percent. The relative decline in investment induced by affiliations with the worst-affected trust companies alone accounted for at least 18.4 percent of the total decline in corporate investment in the United States in 1908. This effect diminished in magnitude over time but persisted for at least five years following the panic.

Keywords: Panic of 1907; Shadow Banks; Trust Companies; Economic Activity; Investment Rates

JEL Codes: E44; G01; G21; N11; N21; N81


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
panic of 1907 (N22)decline in financial services provided by trust companies (G28)
decline in financial services provided by trust companies (G28)decline in investment among affiliated nonfinancial firms (G32)
panic of 1907 (N22)decline in stock prices of small corporations linked to trust companies (G33)
panic of 1907 (N22)decrease in return on equity (G32)
panic of 1907 (N22)decline in dividend rates (G35)
panic of 1907 (N22)increase in average interest costs (G32)
panic of 1907 (N22)decline in investment rates (F21)
decline in investment rates (F21)decline in corporate investment in the U.S. in 1908 (N11)
connections with commercial banks (G21)no similar negative outcomes (I12)

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