Working Paper: NBER ID: w18101
Authors: Monica Martinez-Bravo; Gerard Padró i Miquel; Nancy Qian; Yang Yao
Abstract: We examine the effects of introducing village elections on public goods expenditures, income distribution and land use in rural China. We construct a large panel data set of village administrative records to document the history of political reforms and economic policies for over two hundred villages. We exploit the staggered timing of the introduction of village elections to find that elections significantly increased public goods expenditure financed by villagers. In addition, we find that the introduction of elections caused a moderate decline in income inequality and likely reduced corruption. The results suggest that local officials are better controlled by local elections rather than by centrally managed bureaucratic monitoring.
Keywords: Elections; Public Goods; China
JEL Codes: H11; O38; P16
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Introduction of village elections (K16) | Increased public goods expenditures (H49) |
| Introduction of village elections (K16) | Enhanced accountability of local officials (H83) |
| Enhanced accountability of local officials (H83) | Increased public goods expenditures (H49) |
| Introduction of village elections (K16) | Moderate decline in income inequality (D31) |
| Moderate decline in income inequality (D31) | Redistribution of land and productive assets back to households (P26) |
| Introduction of village elections (K16) | Reduction in pro-elite policies (Z28) |
| Introduction of village elections (K16) | Reduced corruption (H57) |
| Reduced corruption (H57) | Better control of local officials (H77) |
| Better control of local officials (H77) | Increased public goods expenditures (H49) |