Working Paper: NBER ID: w18076
Authors: Patrick Hummel; Brian Knight
Abstract: This paper addresses a key question on the design of electoral systems. Should all voters vote on the same day or should elections be staggered, with late voters observing early returns before making their decisions? Using a model of voting and social learning, we illustrate that sequential elections place too much weight on the preferences and information of early states but also provide late voters with valuable information. Under simultaneous elections, voters equally weigh the available information but place too much weight on their priors, providing an inappropriate advantage to front-runners. Given these trade-offs, simultaneous elections are welfare-preferred if the front-runner initially has a small advantage, but sequential elections are welfare-preferred if the front-runner initially has a large advantage. We then quantitatively evaluate this trade-off using data based on the 2004 presidential primary. The results suggest that simultaneous systems outperform sequential systems although the difference in welfare is relatively small.
Keywords: electoral systems; voting; social learning; welfare analysis
JEL Codes: D7; D8
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| simultaneous elections (D72) | welfare-preferred (D69) |
| sequential elections (D72) | welfare-preferred (D69) |
| frontrunner has small advantage (D79) | simultaneous elections are welfare-preferred (D72) |
| frontrunner has large advantage (D72) | sequential elections are preferred (D72) |
| simultaneous systems (C30) | outperform sequential systems (C69) |
| sequential system (C69) | disproportionate influence to early states (D72) |
| sequential elections (D72) | impact overall election dynamics (D79) |
| simultaneous election system (D72) | higher voter welfare levels (D60) |
| sequential system (C69) | more beneficial for dark horse candidates (D79) |