Working Paper: NBER ID: w18045
Authors: Matthew C. Weinzierl
Abstract: The workhorse model of optimal taxation strongly recommends tagging, but its use in policy is limited. I argue that this puzzle is a symptom of a more fundamental problem. Conventional theory neglects the diverse normative criteria with which, as extensive evidence has shown, most people evaluate policy. In particular, if the classic principle of Equal Sacri...ce augments the standard Utilitarian criterion, optimal tagging is limited. Calibrated simulations of optimal policy with normative diversity of this type simultaneously match three features of U.S. policy: substantial income redistribution; rejection of gender, race, and height tags; and acceptance of a blindness tag. Additional implications increase the appeal of this revision to conventional theory.
Keywords: Optimal Taxation; Equal Sacrifice; Tagging; Redistribution
JEL Codes: D63; H2; H21
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| principle of equal sacrifice (D64) | tagging (Y60) |
| principle of equal sacrifice (D64) | tax burden distribution (H22) |
| principle of equal sacrifice (D64) | optimal marginal tax rates (H21) |
| principle of equal sacrifice (D64) | income redistribution (H23) |
| weight on equal sacrifice (D63) | extent of tagging (C24) |