Working Paper: NBER ID: w17983
Authors: Bronwyn H. Hall; Christian Helmers; Mark Rogers; Vania Sena
Abstract: We survey the economic literature, both theoretical and empirical, on the choice of intellectual property protection by firms. Our focus is on the tradeoffs between using patents and disclosing versus the use of secrecy, although we also look briefly at the use of other means of formal intellectual property protection.
Keywords: Intellectual Property; Patents; Secrecy; Innovation; Firm Behavior
JEL Codes: K11; L29; O34
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| informal IP mechanisms (secrecy, lead time) (O36) | preference over formal mechanisms (patents) (D47) |
| perceived information revelation from patents (O36) | preference for secrecy and lead time (L15) |
| low patent application rate (4%) (O34) | indicates preference for informal IP protection (O34) |
| type of innovation (product vs. process) (O31) | choice of IP protection (O34) |
| patents valued more in discrete product industries (O34) | compared to process innovations (O31) |
| strategic considerations (simultaneous inventions, legal protection) (O36) | influence choice between patents and secrecy (O36) |
| perceived effectiveness of methods (patents vs secrecy) (O34) | influences decision to patent or keep secret (O36) |