Working Paper: NBER ID: w17959
Authors: Ginger Zhe Jin; Marc Rysman
Abstract: We study a new data set of US sports card conventions in order to evaluate the pricing theory of two-sided markets. Conventions are two-sided because organizers must set fees to attract both consumers and dealers. We have detailed information on consumer price, dealer price and, since most conventions are local, the market structure for conventions. We present several findings: first, consumer pricing decreases with competition at any reasonable distance, but pricing to dealers is insensitive to competition and in longer distances even increases with competition. Second, when consumer price is zero (and thus constrained), dealer price decreases more strongly with competition. These results are compatible with existing models of two-sided markets, but are difficult to explain without such models.
Keywords: two-sided markets; sports card conventions; pricing; competition
JEL Codes: D4; L1; L8
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| increased competition (L13) | consumer pricing (D49) |
| increased competition (up to 100 miles) (L19) | dealer pricing (L81) |
| increased competition (longer distances) (F12) | dealer pricing (L81) |
| zero consumer prices (P22) | dealer prices (L11) |